

31 AUG 1978

DD/A Registry
File Security

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

REFERENCE: Memo dtd 11 Aug 78 to DDA from DCI,
same subject

1. Action Requested: It is suggested that you sign the attached letter to the President regarding the question of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

2. Background: Your draft revision of a letter to the President has been reworked and augmented to some extent per your tasking memorandum of 11 August. It is felt that this latest revision aptly portrays the many initiatives you have launched on both the Community and Agency levels to counteract the awesome problem of unauthorized disclosures.

3. Recommendation: Per paragraph 1.

STATINTL

John F. Blake

Att


Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - DDCI
1 - ER

x-subj.

5 SEP 1978

Frank - I take the
blame - I did dictate the
"two employees" # in a rewrite
of the letter - I was actually
in error

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505



5 September 1978

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On 21 July you asked SCC members to report the actions being taken to curb leaks of sensitive information, especially those appearing to be deliberate leaks to undercut Administration policies. I fully share your concern and particularly feel that grave damage is being done to our capability to carry on the legitimate intelligence activities of this country.

Over the past year I have taken the following actions to tighten security in the Intelligence Community:

- Strengthened the Director of Central Intelligence Security Committee as a focal point for reporting and tracking unauthorized disclosures and for raising security consciousness in the Community.
- Directed and maintained a freeze since 1 June 1977 on the total number of sensitive compartmented clearances throughout the Community.
- Introduced the concept of revalidating clearances by effecting zero-based reviews in Intelligence Community and contractor facilities. *The first review completed resulted in a 26% reduction!*
- Tasked contracting and legal authorities to strengthen the security provisions of contracts between commercial firms and intelligence organizations.
- Directed a major overhaul of industrial contractor security activities to include both Agency-sponsored and national programs.

- Developed cooperative procedures with the FBI to ensure a full exchange of information and coordinated reviews of any evidence of espionage activities against our government.

With respect to my specific response to your directives of 21 July, I have taken the following actions within the CIA:

- Reduced the number of people attending my Director's staff meetings where sensitive information such as discussed in the SCC is most likely to be considered.
- Ordered a rigorous personnel security reinvestigation program within CIA based on a 5-year cycle.
- Personally assumed a role in adjudication and penalty assessment procedures involving Agency employees who have violated security regulations.
- Ordered expanded security education and reindoc-trination efforts throughout the Agency.
- Tightened controls over media contacts by CIA personnel.
- Initiated research to enhance security movement of classified information via tamper-resistant security containers and to preclude unauthorized reproduction of documents via use of special paper, special inks and other techniques.
- Dismissed an Agency employee who was found to be transmitting classified information in an unauthorized fashion, probably with the intent of influencing policy.

There are two areas where I believe concentrated Executive policy support and actions are needed in order to help tighten our security. The first involves encouraging



the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate unauthorized disclosures even if prosecution appears, at the outset, improbable for reasons of Security. As it is today, the more sensitive the substance of a leak, the less likely the perpetrator will be identified. The second area involves deciding whether additional legislation is needed with respect to breaches of security and if so, what sort. The more I make the case in public and before the Congress that our national interests are being endangered by security breaches today, the more I am asked directly what, if any, legislation I support. At the present time I waffle my response out of concern for getting ahead of the Administration's position on this issue. I do believe that the time has come when we must grapple with it.

I assure you of my continued dedication to and efforts in support of your desire to reduce the unconscionable flow of leaks we have experienced in the past year and a half.



STATINTL

STANSFIELD TURNER



DD/A
File *Security*

11 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration


FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures

1. Action Requested: None; for your information only.
2. Background: The Office of Security, principally through its Reinvestigation Program (RIP) and package inspections, continues to encounter evidence that some employees are taking classified information to their homes and others are disclosing classified information to unauthorized persons. Such activities are in clear contravention of well-publicized security regulations and directives. Consequently, it is apparent to me that those issuances are not receiving the needed support and emphasis throughout the managerial chain of command. The role of supervisors, particularly senior managers, in promulgating and enforcing security policy, cannot be overstated. While it has always been axiomatic in the Agency that security is a function of command, I believe the disappointing data at hand shows that this dimension of command is being ignored or certainly neglected in some quarters.
3. Staff Position: This is to advise that I intend, in the weeks ahead, to address the senior managers in the offices of the six deputies who report directly to you. I believe I can best accomplish this by seeking permission to attend a senior staff meeting in each area concerned. In these presentations I plan to outline the problem and give some general details on the results of the RIP program and the package inspections. I will underscore the hazards presented by unreported media contacts, the reasons why we cannot permit employees to remove classified documents to homes where no authorized secure storage facilities exist and, above all, the damage that deliberate unauthorized disclosures are doing to this Agency.


I am hopeful that these presentations will stimulate more effective managerial and supervisory behavior toward the problem at hand. Particularly, I am anxious to receive feedback and promote the involvement of these all-important groups. Your office will, of course, be advised of the results of these sessions along with a proposal if further such measures are still seen as necessary.

STATINTL



Robert W. Gambino

Distribution:

Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDA



22 AUG 1978



1. Good
 2. I want to start taking
stronger disciplinary
action on violations mentioned
- #2

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

DMA 78-1986/1

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I assure you that I share your concern about recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Several adverse personnel actions taken against employees guilty of such disclosures have underscored the intensity of my concern.

In an endeavor to cope with this problem we have taken recent positive action. I have implemented a zero-based review of compartmented approvals within CIA and CIA-sponsored contractor facilities. A freeze on the total number of such approvals was imposed throughout the Intelligence Community on 1 June 1977. I have taken steps to strengthen the DCI Security Committee as a focal point for the reporting and follow-up on unauthorized disclosures throughout the Intelligence Community. Within CIA, revised regulations, employee notices, security reindoctrination lectures and the employee reinvestigation program all focus directly on this issue. On 12 July 1978 the requirement to coordinate all contacts with the media through a central office was reemphasized by me to my senior staff.

I would invite your attention, Mr. President, to some aspects of the problem where Executive assistance would be helpful. Current policy does not permit Federal Bureau of Investigation activities in the disclosure area unless the material involved can be declassified for prosecution. This means that the more serious the substance of the leak, the less likely the perpetrator will be found. I urge that the Department of Justice be authorized to direct the FBI to conduct leak investigations regardless of whether ultimate prosecution is feasible. Such action with resultant administrative sanctions in my view would be salutary. I additionally believe it would be most desirable if we resumed a dialogue on the issue that unauthorized disclosures of classified information by current and former Federal government employees be made a Federal crime with appropriate penalties.

Respectfully,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Distribution:

Orig - Adm

1 - BA

Approved For Release 2001/05/01 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070013-8

1 - DDCI

1 - D/Security

DD/A Registry
File Security

Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
7D 24 Hqs

5454

1 August 1978

Director of Central
Intelligence
7D 5607 Hqs

Stan:

I have had Tony Lapham
review the proposed letter to
the President for you signature
and he has no objections.

/s/ Jack

John F. Blake

Atts

Distribution:

Orig RS - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

1 - D/Sec

~~1~~ - DDA Subj

1 - DDA Chrono

1 - JFB Chrono

DDA:JFBBlake:kmg (1 Aug 78)

Atts: DDA 78-2988, -/1

1 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified
Information

1. Action Requested: It is suggested that you sign the attached letter to the President regarding the question of unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

2. Background: The attached letter to the President has been prepared for your signature for the purpose of outlining to him and underscoring the concern with which you view the question of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. This letter is intended to reflect actions which are under way not only within the Central Intelligence Agency but also throughout the Intelligence Community with regard to the subject matter.

3. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached letter to the President.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake

Att

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

2 - DDA *subj.*

1 - D/Security

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

STATINTL ORIGINATOR:



Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

28 July 78
Date

Deputy Director of Security
4E 60 Hqs

Sid:

Attached is an extract from the staff meeting of 12 July 1978 which should be worked in to the paper you are preparing for the Director to send to the President.

/s/ Jack

John F. Blake

Att

Deputy Director for Administration
7D 24 Hqs, x5454

25 Jul 78

DDA:JFBlake:kmg (25 Jul 78)

Distribution:

Orig RS - DD/Sec


1 - DDA Subj (Staff Mtg Extract File)

1 - JFB Chrono

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract from the Staff Meeting Minutes of 12 July 1978:

25X1A



CONFIDENTIAL

EX-110PDET CL BY	14696
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